A SHORT

DISCOURSE

About our Keeping our

MONEY:

SHEWING

That our MONEY may be kept among Our ſelves, and yet our *Confederates* ſtrongly Aſſiſted,

BY A

Deſcent upon *FRANCE.*

By *E. L.*

LONDON:

Printed by *B. Motte*, and are to be ſold by *John Whitlock* near *Stationers-Hall.* 1696.

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A SHORT DISCOURSE About our Keeping our MONEY, &c.

OUR Money is running away by Millions, year after year: which will soon bring us, if it be not done already, to Beggery and Ruin. And now all the Talk is, of Mending our Money. As if a Man had almost bled to death, and were still bleeding; and He, observing his Blood to be bad, should be consulting and contriving how to Mend his Blood. whereas his first Care should be, how to stop his Bleeding. I confess our Money is not so good as it should be: or rather, 'tis as bad as it can be. But yet, upon the whole matter, we should think how to keep it, before we think how to mend it. For as things now go, whether it be mended or not mended, it will be carried all away.

It is now evident to all men (but some Men saw it long since), that our great Payments abroad, and chiefly those in *Flanders*, are the main Cause of the Exportation of our Money. It therefore highly concerns us to

put a ſtop to thoſe Payments at any rate. For we can bear them no longer: We have loſt ſo much Bloud already, that 'tis death to loſe more. But ſhall we not aſſiſt our Confederates? Yes, by all meanes, to the utmoſt of our power. For otherwiſe all *Europe* muſt be inſlaved to the *French*, and We among the reſt. It is therefore abſolutely neceſſary that we keep our Money: and 'tis as neceſſary that we powerfully aſſiſt our Confederates. Both which things (tho ſeeming ſo inconſiſtent) may at once be done, by our Aſſailing the *French* Coaſt by Sea: or in other words, by a vigorous Deſcent upon *France*.

A Project of ſuch a Deſcent I preſumed to publiſh in the year Ninety one. which Project was generally approved, and the whole Kingdom was in Expectation that it would be proſecuted. Alſo the year next after, a Deſcent was intended: and another the year following, tho, as it fell out, thoſe Deſigns were not put in Execution. And in the third year was our Attempt at *Camaret* Bay.

But as to the Project, it is briefly this. That a good Body of Foot (twenty thouſand at leaſt, but the more the better) be Shipp'd for the Coaſt of *France*; there to move to and fro as they ſee occaſion, and to Land where they find it convenient: and further to ſeize and fortify ſome open Sea-Town, ſo as it may contain a great and ſtrong Garriſon. Which Garriſon being put in a State of defence, the Naval Army to proceed to new Adventures, and to ſeize and fortify other Places in like manner.

Here I am to make good the two things before mention'd: Firſt, that in ſo doing we ſhall keep our Money; and ſecondly, that we ſhall effectually aſſiſt our Confederates. To which two things I ſhall adde a third; That the Deſign is very feaſable, and hardly poſſible to miſcarry.

In

In the first place therefore, while we assail the Sea-Coast of *France*, and plant Garrisons upon it; tho it be a great Expence, we shall still keep our Money amongst our selves. For whither should it go? The *French* have good luck, if they get any thing from us in this Affair. And none else have to do with it. At present our Army in *Flanders* carries our Money thither, (some say a Million and a half yearly); and our Fleet kept upon the Coasts of *Spain*, stops Money from coming to us from thence: and a great Sum goes yearly to *Piemont*. But by a Descent upon *France* our Money will be no way diminish'd: and what ever is laid out, will come back and Circulate amongst us. Here will be no carrying out our Coin and Bullion, nor the horrible disadvantage of Remittances.

In the second place, By a Descent upon *France* we shall give most effectual Assistance to our Confederates. If we did nothing else, but overlay the *French* at Sea, and thereby destroy their Trade and Navigation; even this thing only would be an effectual Assistance. For whereas now the *French* are rampant, by the *immense Riches* ('tis their Gazettiers word) which they have taken from us; they would then be impoverish'd to such a Degree, as to be no way able to carry on the War against the Confederates. And this thing we must do in the first place. For we are ruin'd unless we powerfully protect our Trade; and the same Force that protects the Trade of *England* powerfully, will destroy that of *France*. Which things I hope our Parliament hath done already, by giving a larger Summe than formerly for our Sea-Service. I have said before, that our overlaying our Enemies by Sea, will prove a great Assistance to our Friends. But if beside this, we also Assail the *French* Coast with Land-Forces, that Assistance will be much greater. For it will make so great a Diversion,

that

that both *Flanders* and *Germany*, and likewiſe *Piemont* and *Catalonia*, will feel an exceeding great Eaſe and Benefit by it. We are not able to maintain an Army in *Flanders*: it will bring ſwift Deſtruction upon us. But we are able to maintain a Coaſt Warre. And our Confederates muſt and will be content, if we do for them as much as we are able. Suppoſe we take forty thouſand Men out of *Flanders*, to aſſail the *French* Coaſts. If theſe draw away, or keep back, a greater number of *Frenchmen*, as they will certainly do; 'tis the ſame thing or better. And we may be making Deſcents in *Normandy* and *Bretagne*, before the Armies in *Flanders* can take the field. By theſe Deſcents we ſhall touch the Enemy in his moſt ſenſible part, (as His Majeſty hath been pleas'd to expreſs it); that is, on his Sea Coaſt. How tender they are here, we found at our Bombarding of *Havre de Grace*. When we came before that Town, their Militia's and Regular Troops were commanded thither from all Quarters, with all haſte poſſible; and the Alarm reach'd *Paris* it ſelf. From whence that King (as all our Relations agreed) ſent away his own Guards to the Sea Coaſts. What to do? Not to hinder our Bombardment, for therein they could do no ſervice: but to hinder the Deſcent of our Land-Forces; who were not above ſeven thouſand in number. It was this handful of Men, that caus'd all that Terror and Affrightment. We may ſee therefore, that tho the Project here offer'd ſhould fail in the main; though we ſhould not be able to fortify and make good any Town, nor ſo much as Land our Men; yet the very Attempting theſe things in ſeveral places (in one place to day, and a hundred Miles off to morrow); would ſo haraſs and torment the *French*, that they would never be able to bear it. But there is no fear that the Project here offer'd ſhould fail in the main, or not have its full Effect.

In

In the third place, the thing propoſed is feaſable and eaſy, and hardly poſſible to miſcarry. 'Tis hardly poſſible that the *French* ſhould hinder our Landing; 'tis hardly poſſible they ſhould hinder our Fortifying; or ſhould take from us the Places we fortify. I ſhall ſpeak firſt to our Landing. And here I muſt confeſs, that if we ſhould reſolve to Land at one place preciſely; and the *French* ſhould diſcover our Deſign ſome Months before hand; and ſhould accordingly provide for the defence of that place, with a great Body of Horſe and Foot, with Forts and Intrenchments, and with Bombs and Cannon; and we knowing all this, ſhould attempt that place notwithſtanding; we might fairly be repuls'd and baffled, as we were at *Canaret* Bay. But if we are at large, to Land where we ſee convenient, there is no ſuch danger. When we ſail'd from that Bay towards *Flanders*, along by the *French* Shores, the whole Country was in a high Alarme: and they brought down all their Forces to Guard their Coaſt. But yet, (as I have it from thoſe who ſaw it with their Eyes), there were a great many places, convenient for Landing, that had no Guard at all, either upon them or near them: we ſeeing far and wide that the Coaſt was clear. And both our Landmen and Seamen were moſt chearfully deſirous to go upon *French* Ground, if there had been Orders for it. Nor had they in truth found any Oppoſition. Sir *Walter Rawleigh* doth fully demonſtrate, that the Landing upon an Enemies Coaſt can by no means be hindred. Provided the Aſſailants be Maſters at Sea, and in caſe the Coaſt be large and acceſſible. Which thing is alſo confirm'd by the Experience of all Ages. For 'tis hardly to be found in Hiſtory, that ever any Attempt of this kind miſcarried, except Ours which I mention'd but now. And Reaſon tells us, that our Landing upon *France* (to ſpeak of that in particular) cannot be prevented. Suppoſe we have

forty

forty thouſand Men imbark'd, to aſſail the *French* Coaſt: and the *French* have fifty thouſand to defend it. Their Coaſt upon Our Channell, (for That muſt be the Scene of theſe Actions) is five hundred Miles in length, ſo that here is a thouſand Men for every ten Miles. But how ſlender a Guard will this be againſt our Invading Army? Had they a hundred thouſand Men, or a thouſand for every five Miles of ground, all would be found too few to oppoſe our Landing.

I hope I have made out, that our Landing cannot be hinder'd by the *French*. I muſt now ſhew that they cannot hinder our Fortifying. It would be very ſtrange, if ſuch a Body of Men, having the Sea and a Fleet behind them; and having at leaſt ten days time to Intrench, before a ſuperiour or even an equal Force can be brought againſt them; ſhould not be able ſo to cover themſelves, as not to fear the Inſults of any Enemy. The Works we caſt up at *Landen* in one ſhort night, the *French* Lines in *Flanders*, and ſeveral late Circumvallations, ſhew what great Things great Numbers can do. But we muſt not think of Pioniers for this Work; our Soldiers muſt do it themſelves. And they will do it chearfully, if thoſe that labour have ſome Pay extraordinary. Which was the way of the old Princes of *Orange*, the Grandfather and great Uncle of our King. Moreover the place where we Intrench, will be the place we intend for a Garriſon. And the Line which may be full mann'd by ten thouſand Men, when the Works are compleated; may contain the whole Army for a time. For none of theſe Garriſons ſhould be leſs then ten thouſand; the greater they are, the farther they will command, and the better they will maintain themſelves.

And

And now I come to the point remaining, which is, That 'tis hardly poſſible that the *French* ſhould take theſe Garriſons from us. And this is evident of it ſelf; if the Places be (as they ought) relievable by Sea, and not commanded by Land. A Place that is compleatly fortified; that hath a great Garriſon, with great ſtore of Cannon, and hath room for great Renforcements; and that lying oppoſite to *England*, with a narrow Sea between, may receive theſe Renforcements (and all manner of Supplies) with every Snatch of Wind; I ſay ſuch a Place as this, may juſtly be reputed Impregnable.

Thus I am come to the End of the Project: which is, the Eſtabliſhing ſome Garriſons upon the Coaſt of *France*. There is no more to be done: the reſt will do it ſelf. And as I have ſaid elſewhere; England *will then be glorious, when we have a Range of Garriſons the whole length of the Channel, upon* French *Ground, and maintain'd by* French *Contributions*. Every ſuch Garriſon, with a thouſand or two of Horſe and Dragoons put into it, would diſmember a whole Province. If *Tourville*, when he Landed ſo eaſily at *Torbay*, had had an Army on board him, and had ſettled a rampant Garriſon there, would not the whole County of *Devon* (and *Cornwall* to boot) have been diſmember'd by it? And had not *Deal* (or any place upon the *Downs*) done the ſame by *Kent*; and any place in *Suſſex*, and another in *Dorſet*, diſmembred each of thoſe Counties? Eſpecially if the *French* were ſtill Maſters at Sea; and had ſtill an Army on board, to pour in upon us (when they pleas'd) from any of thoſe places Conſider, what a horrible Condition we had then been in. and in the ſame Condition will *France* be, in caſe this Project be duely proſecuted. They will be ſo diſtracted and confounded by it, that they will never be able to reſiſt the

Confederates, aſſailing them in all Quarters. We may then hope for a good and ſpeedy End of this Warre: whereas by keeping our Army in *Flanders*, there is no hopes of it. For as things go there, tho our forces be never ſo great, tho we over-power the Enemy never ſo much; we muſt account it a Glorious Succeſs, if we take one Town in a year. But what doth this ſignify towards making an end of the Warre? At this rate we may be twenty years in recovering *Flanders*: And we, for our parts, ſhall be ruin'd in the tenth part of that time. For if our Forrain Payments continue two years longer, they will entirely Ruine us: and I doubt one year will do it.

If from *Flanders* we could carry the Warre into *France*, there would be ſome hopes. But 'tis plain we cannot do this, becauſe we do not. Tho 'tis a great wonder that we cannot. Why cannot We March into *France*, as well as the *French* have march'd ſo often into *Flanders*; the *Dauphin* into *Germany* two years ago; and the *Grand Viſier* to *Vienna*, a hundred Miles within the Emperor's Quarters? As for the *French* Lines, they are a meer Cuckow Hedge. We might not only fly over it, (as we did at *Namur*, to beſiege that place), but might go beſide it: their Quarters beyond the *Maes* lying open. But as I have ſaid elſewhere, *The great and ſwift Conquerours in all Ages, never lay pelting at Frontier Garriſons, but broke into the Countries.* We ſhall never ſee a good Concluſion of this Warre, till the Warre be carried into *France*: and ſince that cannot be done by Land, we muſt do it by Sea, which is the End and Drift of the Deſign here propoſed.

Some

Some loose things are here added, relating to the Discourse above-written.

1. No great number of Horse are required for this Service. For they are not useful either in Landing or Fortifying: which are the things to be done. It seems therefore sufficient, that a thousand or two of them be imbark'd at first, and about twice as many ly ready in *England*, till there be occasion for them: that is, till some Garrisons be settled to which they may go. For to have them all on Shop-board while the Fleet and Army is upon Wing, and may be plying to and again for several days, would be too chargeable and cumberlome.

2. It is no way necessary, that the Places we fortify should be good Ports. The *French* have few such upon this Coast: and for these Places, 'tis sufficient if they are relievable by Sea, and can receive and secure small Vessels. For the business of these Garrisons is; that we may harrass and torment the *French*, from these Garrisons. Perhaps another year, when the *French* are weaken'd and humbled, we may think of Attacquing their best Ports, and of a Voyage Royal. But at present we should attempt nothing, but what we are sure we can do: for what we are sure we can do, will sufficiently ruin the *French* King. It will cost us some Labour, but we shall run no Hazard.

3. A Voyage Royal, or a main Invasion, will not be of that advantage, as the desultory Sea Warre here proposed. In that way we may perhaps do something, if our Force be throughout superiour, and We cleerly and for continuance Masters of the Field: But in the otherway, we shall be sure to do something, and to gain our point, tho the Enemies Force should be much superiour to Ours. By the first way, we shall only divide the Enemies Force by dividing our own, without any further Advantage.

4. Forty thousand of our Men on Shipboard, will do more Service to *Flanders* by the Diversion they make, then a much greater number kept there. And 'tis well known, how great benefit the Duke of *Savoy* received, by our Fleet with a few Land-Men aboard, hovering about *Provence* last Summer. It drew so many *French* to guard that Coast, that the Duke took *Exil* the while, without Interruption.

5. That brave-spirited Prince deserves our highest Regards. And the Assistance we have given him may seem well bestowed. But we cannot send more Money to *Piemont*, whence it will never return. It were better for us to expend twice or thrice as much in our own Seas; for That Money will return, or rather will never go from us. And this powerful Revulsive will be felt in *Piemont*, to its great Ease and Benefit. But let it be as it will, we must send away no more Money.

6. Our Silver Coin that is left, as Mr. *Lowndes* computes it, may be about five Millions and a half, (but some think, it cannot be neer so much); Whereof four Millions, being Clip'd half way, is in effect but two Millions. And so three Millions and a half is the Summe effective. What will become of us, if a full Moiety of this Money be carried to *Piemont* and *Flanders*, this very next year; for the growing Expence, beside great Debts that must be satisfied? And either the Payments must be there made by Money *in specie*; or they must be made by Bills, with most grievous loss, the Exchange being so high against us. So that 'twere better our Money went at once. And Merchants know that forrain Payments, whether made by Bills or *in specie*, are the same thing in effect; and carry Money alike out of the Kingdom.

7. This height of the Exchange against us, occasion'd by our great Payments abroad, is an infinite disadvantage

yantage to our Merchants: and will continue as long as thoſe Payments do, to the ruin of our Trade, and conſequently of our Nation. As for our Clipp'd Money, That had no effect upon the Exchange, till *Guineas* did riſe: which was leſs than a year ſince. And when our Coin is reform'd, that Effect will ceaſe. But our forrain Payments are the more durable and ſubſtantial Cauſe. It is theſe Payments that make Silver more valuable, and better, and dearer, in other Parts than it is in *England*. We cannot have weight for weight: nor receive ſo many Ounces there, as we pay here. It is moſt certain, that our Money never flyes from us, but when Silver is more valuable in other places than in *England*. Now Silver (as all other Commodities) is there moſt valuable and deareſt, where it is moſt in demand. And 'tis moſt in demand, where there are greateſt Occaſions for it, and the moſt and greateſt Payments to be made. They therefore that are to make theſe Payments, muſt buy the Convenience of having Money there for that Uſe, and the Exchange will run high againſt them. Which is our preſent caſe.

8. I have omitted One Advantage, which we ſhall have in our Deſcents upon *France*: and that is, that we ſhall never want Men for this Service. Men will be as forward and willing to go for *France*, provided they have good *Engliſh* Officers; as now they are backward and unwilling to go into *Flanders*. The Service in *Flanders* having got a very ill Name, amongſt our common Men.

9. I have alſo omitted one Leak of our Money, which is to be well conſider'd. We keep an Army in *England*, at a great Expence: and moſt of this Army are Forrainers. Who living very cloſe, and ſpending little, lay up a good part of their Pay. It deſerves an Enquiry, whether it be true that is ſaid of them; That they are continually

nually (even the common Soldiers, and much more the Officers) ſending their Money, which they thus ſave, to their own Countries. If it be ſo, tho the particular Summes be not very great; yet there being many thouſands of them, it may amount to a large Summe in the whole. And it may prove as bad to keep Forrainers in *England*, as to maintain an *Engliſh* Army in Forrain Parts. Some think it no way neceſſary, to have a Forrain Army in *England*. For the People of *England* are ſo firmly Knit to his Majeſty, both by Intereſt and Affection, that there is little need of Forrainers to force us to Obedience. *Ariſtotle* is too ſevere, when he ſays in his *Politicks*, (*Lib.* 5. *Cap.* 10.), That forrain Guards are Tyrannical: for juſt and good Princes may have them. But ſome think that in *England*, under another King, forrain Guards and a forrain Army might be of dreadfull danger to our Liberties. Tho under his Majeſty now regnant, (who hath been our Redeemer, and is ſtill our Protector and Preſerver) there is no Cauſe to fear.

I moſt humbly ſubmit theſe things, to the Conſideration of our States now Aſſembled. 'Tis They that muſt take care, *Nequid Reſpublica detrimenti capiat*, That the Kingdom receive no prejudice: or rather, as things go now, That it be not deſtroyed. Which it muſt be, if we part with more Money; and which therefore we muſt not do. No Concerting of Meaſures, no Treaties or Agreements, can oblige us to Impoſſibilities; and that which cannot be done without deſtroying the Kingdom, is morally and honeſtly impoſſible. We may ſay honeſtly and truly, that for us to part with more Money, is a thing that cannot poſſibly be done.

Since

SInce the writing of the foregoing Treatiſe, the Commons with great Prudence have Addreſs'd the King, that he will be pleaſed to procure; that the Commodities and Proviſions ſent from *England* to our Forces Abroad, may be exempted from Duties and Exciſes. Which is, we may preſume, in order to the ſupplying our *Flanders* Army with thoſe Things from *England*, inſtead of ſending Money for that Uſe. And this, I confeſs, will put a great Stop to the carrying out our Money. But no ſmall Quantities of Money muſt ſtill go to *Flanders*. For tho the common Soldiers may be content with Proviſions brought by Sea, yet the Officers will not. They muſt fare better, and live like Gentlemen, and ſpend their Money. Which Money thus ſpent will amount to a large Summe. And what is ſpent in *Flanders*, is loſt to *England*. But in our Deſcents we ſhall ſpend no Money: and all muſt be content with what they have from *England*, or can get from the Enemy. Moreover, tho our ſupplying our *Flanders* Army from *England* may leſſen the Neceſſity of a Deſcent, yet the Convenience and Advantage of it continues the ſame. And we may be confident, the *French* dread it above all things in the World. According to all humane probability, it will in one Summer give the *French* Tyranny a mortal Wound, if not break it to pieces. Eſpecially if our whole *Quota*, our whole eighty ſeven thouſand Men, were employed upon it. And if but forty thouſand were thus employed, the reſt (if it muſt be ſo) being in *Flanders* and elſewhere, we might well expect great things.

Some think that a Naval Army might do great things, without the help of Garriſons. But that is a miſtake. For they can do nothing, as to ravaging and commanding the Country, without Horſe; and theſe cannot readily disbark and reimbark. Beſide, by being long on Ship-board, the Horſes will be diſabled and ſpoil'd. And in this way, it will be thought

thought a great Adventure, if we go five Miles from the Sea-ſide. But if we have nothing to do, but to croſs over to a Garriſon or ſtrong Quarter of our own, where we may Land without any poſſibility of Interruption, and where a good Body of Horſe lyes ready to joyn us; we may make a much greater Impreſſion.

In caſe we have only one Garriſon, the *French* may perhaps coop it up with Lines, after their *Flanders* faſhion. But in caſe we have ſeveral, back'd by our Naval Army, they can never bear up againſt them. So that tho they had no other Enemy, and ſhould oppoſe us with treble our Force, yet we ſhould be too hard for them, having ſo great an advantage. And this is the way to put a ſpeedy and victorious End to the Warre; without ſending out, or carrying out our Money. Whereas otherwiſe; this heavy and deſtructive Warre is like to continue, our Money like to be all gone, and the Kingdom to be utterly ruin'd.

And thus much hath been ſaid about Keeping our Money. The Mending I leave to Others. But the admirable Reſolves of the *Houſe of Commons*, have made that work ſhort and eaſy.

FINIS.